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8.1  Introduction 
The structure of Japanese financial markets and the behavior of  observed 
financial prices have raised a number of important interrelated questions in the 
minds of American observers, among others. The first set, of particular con- 
cern to American businessmen, pertain to: 
1. The cost of  capital to  Japanese$rms.  Is it lower than the cost of capital 
to U. S.  and other firms, providing an explanation for the higher rate of invest- 
ment in Japan? And if so, why? What are the implications, if any, for the trade 
balance? The cost of capital is usually represented as a weighted average of 
the cost of borrowing (measured, e.g., by the real interest rate) and the cost 
of equity financing (inferred, e.g.,  from the ratio of required corporate earn- 
ings to the price of equity). A major theme of Meerschwam (in this volume), 
and for the conclusion of this paper as well, is that this standard way of view- 
ing the cost-of-capital question is incomplete. But, for the moment, it does 
serve to introduce the next two Japanese financial prices whose behavior has 
raised puzzles. 
Is it lower than that in the United States and 
other industrialized countries, in real terms? If so, why? 
Why are they so high relative, for example, to 
earnings? Alternatively, why did they rise so much in the  1980s? One of  a 
number of possible contributing explanations for high price/eamings ratios is 
number 2 above, a low interest rate (used to discount expected future earnings 
2.  The Japanese interest rate. 
3.  Japanese equity prices. 
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or dividends into current equity  prices).  Another  is  a  high  expected  real 
growth rate in the economy (raising expected future earnings relative to ob- 
served current earnings). Because corporations hold land, yet another of the 
contributing factors to high equity prices is high Japanese land prices. 
Why are they so high relative, for example, to 
rents? Alternatively, why did they rise so much in the 1980s?  The two contrib- 
uting explanations given for high equity prices apply equally here: a low inter- 
est rate (used to discount expected future rents into current land prices) and a 
high expected economic growth rate (raising expected future rents relative to 
observed current rents). A final question that, the paper shall argue, may be 
intrinsically tied to the question of low Japanese interest rates, relates to the 
exchange rate. 
Why is it so high, in real terms? 
Alternatively, why has it increased so much over time? What are the implica- 
tions? 
No single paper can hope to answer all these questions. Much is written on 
the subject of Japanese financial markets every year. The institutional details, 
as well as the market prices themselves, change rapidly, by virtue of domestic 
financial  deregulation  and  innovation,  international  financial  liberalization, 
and tax reform. A goal of this paper is to survey the issues, including a variety 
of recent contributions (many of them  unpublished)  to the study  of one or 
another of the financial market prices enumerated above, in brief enough form 
that one can see how the different questions fit together. The survey does not 
purport to be exhaustive of the literature, however. 
There is a fundamental thread that winds through the issues, and it is worth 
spelling it out here. This paper subscribes to the common view that a low real 
interest rate and a high expected growth rate are two major factors explaining 
high price/earnings  ratios in the stock market and high priceirental ratios in 
the land market in Japan. One respect in which the paper deviates from con- 
ventional  views  is in arguing  that the Japanese  real  interest rate  may  have 
remained low in the 1980s despite high integration into international financial 
markets.  Even so, a major apparent  puzzle that remains  is to explain  why 
priceiearnings and priceirental ratios were not just as high (or even higher) in 
the  1960s and 1970s, when Japanese real interest rates were just as low (or 
even lower) and Japanese growth rates were just as high (or-until  1973- 
even higher).  The difficulty, in other words, is to explain why priceiearnings 
and priceirental ratios increased so much in the 1980s. 
The proposed  answer is that, in previous decades and especially prior to 
1973, institutional aspects of the Japanese financial system, such as those dis- 
cussed in Meerschwam (in this volume), rendered the observed interest rate in 
large part irrelevant for the pricing of assets such as equities and land. This 
answer implies that anyone able to borrow from a bank or government agency 
at artificially low interest rates for the purpose of acquiring land or corporate 
equity, could have made “excess” profits; but not just anyone was able to do 
4. Japanese land prices. 
5.  The  foreign exchange value of the yen. 227  Japanese Finance 
so. Such sources of  funds were not available to the man in the street, or even 
to the corporation in the street. To  those favored corporations that did have 
access to such funds, such as members of the industrial groupings known as 
keiretsu, the number of profitable investment projects typically exceeded the 
supply of funds available. 
The international financial liberalization that has taken place in Japan over 
the last  10 years has been important for many reasons, not least because it 
forced the pace of domestic financial liberalization. But it is possible that the 
primary effect of  the structural changes in the 1970s was not to bring the level 
of “the” cost of funds in Japan up to the level of the world real interest rate as 
is conventionally suggested.  Rather, the primary efect was to bring the cost 
of  capital facing a typical unafiliated Japanese jrm  or institutional investor 
down toward the cost of capital facing a favored keiretsu Jirm. This process 
included both the accumulation of a vast pool of savings-particularly  in the 
hands of  institutional investors-and  the development of  active bond  and 
equity markets in which these funds could be invested. The increase in the 
pool of  funds available for arbitrage purposes helps to explain the price in- 
creases in equity and land markets in the 1980s. 
The paper begins with the issue of access to cheap borrowing, then shifts to 
a consideration of  the equity  markets (including such  issues as dividend- 
payout rates, P/E ratios, and corporate taxation), considers domestic and in- 
ternational determinants of the real interest rate, and concludes with a discus- 
sion of internal financing. Measurement and accounting problems occur from 
the beginning and will be discussed as we proceed. But, throughout, the paper 
attempts to concentrate on those trends in  financial prices that are so strong 
that one cannot easily attribute them entirely to measurement problems. 
8.2  The Standard Weighted-Average Measure of the Cost of Capital 
The claim that the cost of capital is lower in Japan, perhaps giving Japanese 
firms an “unfair” advantage, arose with some American businessmen in the 
early  1980s. The original  statements (Semiconductor Industry Association 
1980; Hatsopoulos 1983), while highly influential, are considered by some to 
have been somewhat simplistic. Later versions are more persuasive (e.g., Hat- 
sopoulos  and  Brooks  1986,  1989 and,  esp.,  Hatsopoulos,  Krugman,  and 
Summers  1988). A traditional measure of  the cost of  capital is a weighted 
average of the cost of borrowing and the cost of equity: 
(1)  rc = w rd + (1 - w)  re, 
1. For example, by Balassa and Noland (1988, p.  1 13). As of May 1990, one year after the first 
draft of  this paper was written, the cost of  capital does appear to be approximately as high in Japan 
as in the United States, as the result of  increases in interest rates and an accompanying decline in 
the Japanese stock market. 228  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
where r, is the cost of debt, re is the cost of equity, and w is the relative weight 
of debt in total financing. Under this definition, the claim can be broken down 
into some combination of the following three possibilities:  (a)  the cost of bor- 
rowing is lower in Japan, (6)  the cost of equity is lower in Japan, or (c)  the 
weight on debt financing (versus equity financing) is higher in Japan. All three 
statements contain some truth.2 
8.2.1  Real Interest Rates 
Nominal interest rates in Japan have been below those in the United States 
during most  of the postwar  period,  and continuously  since  1977. Japanese 
inflation has also been relatively low since 1977, and it is of course the real 
interest rate, not the nominal rate, that matters for investment.  But calcula- 
tions using 10-year government bond yields suggest that Japanese real interest 
rates were below U.S. real rates virtually continuously from 1967 to 1988 (see 
Bernheim and Shoven (1986) estimate that the Japanese real interest rate, 
on average, lay below the U.S. real rate during the period  1971-82,  although 
the difference was quite small for the long-term rates, which presumably are 
the ones that matter for investment: 0.23, 0.30, or 0.93, depending whether 
expected inflation is estimated by, respectively, the inflation rate over the pre- 
ceding year, the average ex post rate, or a simple ARIMA model.4 
In the period  1982-84,  the U.S. long-term real interest rate rose substan- 
tially above that in Japan and other G-7 countrie~.~  This differential is widely 
considered to have been the result of a U.S. fiscal expansion (which was ac- 
commodated neither by monetary  policy nor by private saving in the United 
States), counterpoised to fiscal contraction in Japan and some major European 
countries.'j Bernheim  and Shoven (1986) put the U.S.-Japan  long-term  real 
interest differential, on average for the period  1983-85,  at 2.02. 
fig. 8.1).3 
2. The three-way breakdown has been calculated by Friend and Tokutsu (1987), among others. 
3. The charts are borrowed  from  an  uncirculated  paper  by  Lawler,  Loopesko,  and  Dudey 
(1988). Fig. 8.1 above may understate the Japanese real interest rate in the 1970s, both because 
the actual inflation rates that are used overstate expected inflation rates and because the govern- 
ment bond rates that are used were too low to be willingly absorbed by private investors. 
4. Lawler, Loopesko, and Dudey (1988, p. 26) show real interest rates on Japanese one-year 
government bonds that have been below U.S. yields during virtually the entire  1965-88  period. 
Friend and Tokutsu (1987) find that the real cost of debt, weighted between short term and long 
term, was .80 percentage points lower in Japan than the United States on average over the period 
1962-84 (1.70 lower over the period 197044). 
5. The increase in the U.S. real interest differential from  1981 to mid-1984 is often credited 
with much of the explanation for the contemporaneous appreciation of  the dollar. The differential 
vis-8-vis the real interest rate in Japan was no larger than that vis-8-vis Germany and some other 
countries. But then the movement of the dollar against the yen was actually less than against the 
mark and other major European currencies (contrary to a widespread impression) and peaked in 
1982 rather than February  1985. 
6. One of the many possible references on the capital inflow that resulted from the shift in the 
U.S. monetary/fiscal mix in the  1980s is Frankel (1988a). References on the forces behind the 
inflow from Japan in particular are given in Frankel (1988b). 229  Japanese Finance 
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Source: Lawler, Loopesko, and Dudey (1988). 
Long-term real interest rates, 10-year government bond yields 
The U.S.-Japan real interest differential has been smaller in the years since 
1985 than it was in the first half of the 1980~.~  This differential, even if small, 
was still present, however, in mid-1989 (anywhere from one-half percent to 3 
percent, depending on the measure). I estimated the 10-year real interest dif- 
ferential to have been 0.8 percent as of the end of August,  1989.8 (We post- 
7. This was  .58 since  1985 according to French and Poterba (1989, p. 40) (average of  first 
quarters of 1986, 1987 and 1988);  they use long-term government bond yields minus the previous 
year's inflation rate. 
8. On 23 August 1989 the nominal interest differential between the United States and Japan was 
3.3  percent for 10-year government bond yields, 3.5 percent for one-year Eurocurrency rates, and 
5.6 percent for bank prime lending rates. A survey of forecasters conducted by Alan Teck on that 
day put the difference in expected inflation rates at 2.5 percent for the  10-year horizon (4.75 
percent in the United States vs. 2.25 percent in Japan) and 2.6 percent for the one-year horizon. 
(Currency  Forecasrers' Digest. White Plains, N.Y., September 1989.) The CPI inflation differen- 
tial was 3.3  percent in 1988 and 2.0 percent in the first five months of  1989 (IMF data). As noted 
earlier, some further narrowing of the real interest differential took place in early 1990. 230  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
pone, until sec. 8.4, the question of how such a differential can have persisted 
despite the apparent international integration of financial markets.) 
The  standard “capitalization” formula for the equity price/earnings ratio 
and the pricekental ratio is 
r -  g’ 
where r is the real interest rate used to discount expected future earnings or 
rents to the present, and g is the expected growth rate of earnings or rents, as 
the case may be. (“Earnings” should really be defined as net profits after new 
investment, for the formula to be correct; see n.  18 be lo^.)^ Sometimes the 
best we can do to get an idea of the expected growth rate of earnings or rents 
is to assume that they are equal to the expected growth rate of the economy. If 
r - g were a number like  .02 in  the world economy at large (which ad- 
mittedly may be too low), then the Japanese interest rate would only have to 
be lower by  .01  -or  the growth rate higher by .01,  for that matter-to  explain 
a doubling of the price/earnings ratio.’” 
Nevertheless, because the real interest differential is thought to be  small, 
with the exception of the early 1980s, those who argue that the cost of capital 
is low in Japan and that this has presented a problem for the competitiveness 
of U.S. industry ever since 1973 (e.g., Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Summers 
1988) tend not to emphasize the real  interest rate.  They choose, rather, to 
emphasize the cost of equity financing and the relative weight of debt versus 
equity in corporate financing. (We will return to the role of the real interest 
rate later, however.) 
8.2.2  Leverage (DebtfEquity Ratios) 
In the past, Japanese corporations have had a much higher ratio of debt to 
equity than U.S. corporations, that is, they have been much more highly lev- 
eraged. (In terms of eq. [  I] earlier, the debvequity ratio is w/(  1 - w).)  In the 
period  1970-72,  for example, debt/equity ratios in Japan were four times as 
high  as in the United States. This commonly observed characteristic of  the 
Japanese system is one major reason why calculations often show a lower 
overall cost of capital in Japan than in the United States; equity financing is 
known to be more expensive than debt financing in any market, presumably 
9. The formula also works for firms’ dividend/price ratio, again with the growth rate properly 
defined. 
10. A similar point is made by French and Poterba (1989, p. 19). However, they conclude that, 
while a lower real rate of interest in Japan might be able to explain the high level of Japanese stock 
prices on average during their sample period (the 1970s  and 1980s). it cannot explain the increase 
during the last three years, 1986-88. 231  Japanese Finance 
because portfolio investors demand a higher expected return on equity to com- 
pensate them for higher risk.” 
How have Japanese firms been able to rely so heavily on debt? As a number 
of authors have pointed out, a particular debuequity ratio that would be very 
risky for a U.S. firm may have been less risky for a Japanese firm. There are 
several reasons for this. (1) Much of the borrowing, particularly for members 
of a keiretsu, was from the firm’s main bank. A main bank would not cut off 
lending in time of financial difficulty; to the contrary it would do all it could 
to  see the  company through  (e.g.,  Abegglen  and  Stock  1985; Crum and 
Meerschwam  1987; Meerschwam, in this volume). (2)  Until recently, all loans 
had to be collaterized.  This certainly reduced the risk from the viewpoint of 
the bank, which in turn helps explain the reduced danger, from the viewpoint 
of the  corporation, that bank  lending  (as well  as the  ability to sell bonds) 
would dry up in time of difficulty. (3) It has been suggested that such govern- 
ment policies  as allowing the formation  of cartels in event of  recession re- 
duced the risk of financial difficulty or bankruptcy.’* (4) It has also been sug- 
gested  that  the  practice  of  paying  workers  a  substantial  fraction  of  their 
compensation in the form of twice-yearly bonuses that vary with the success 
of the company acts as a sort of profit-sharing  mechanism and again reduces 
the risk of bankruptcy. I3 
In any case, it is important to note that the seemingly robust regularity that 
“Japanese firms are highly leveraged’ now appears to be a thing of the past. 
The debvequity ratio fell throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, and has by 
one measure fallen below the level in the United States, as shown in the last 
two columns of table 8.1 (from French and Poterba  1989).14  This reversal is 
due only in small part to the increase in corporate leverage in the 1980s that 
generated so much alarm in the United States, partly because of its association 
with “junk bonds.” The reversal is due primarily to the decline in Japan, which 
is in turn due, at least in an arithmetic sense, to the soaring value of Japanese 
equities and to decreased reliance on the main bank system as well as to the 
1 I. The apparent conclusion that a firm can lower its cost of  capital by increasing the weight on 
debt would only hold if  the cost of equity could be assumed to be independent (whereas it might 
in fact be expected to rise as the firm’s levered beta rises). 
12. On the so-called recession cartels, see Yamamura  (1982) and Meerschwam (in this vol- 
ume). 
13. Other reasons have been given as well why a given corporate balance sheet that might spell 
excessive risk in the United States would not be as worrisome in Japan. For example, Ahegglen 
and Stalk (1985, p.  165) argue in this connection that a typical Japanese firm does not consolidate 
the financial assets held by  its subsidiaries into its own balance sheet-where  a corresponding 
U.S. firm might do so-and  carries land and securities on its books at original cost. (But the fact 
that much of Japanese equity is held by other firms, so that the total amount of equity in Japan is 
not as large as appears on the books, seems like a reason why Japanese debtkquity ratios might 
be understated.)  Some of these accounting questions are discussed under the heading of price/ 
earnings ratios below. 
14. This occurred in 1986. The debtkquity ratio actually fell to half the U.S. level in an esti- 
mate for 1988 (according to French and Poterba 1989, p. 8 and table 4). 232  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 8.1  Price-Earnings Ratios (PIE), Dividend-Price Ratios (Div/P, in %), and 
Debt-Equity Ratios (D/Eq), Japan and the United States,  1970-88 
PIE  DivlP  DIEq 
Year  Japan  United States  Japan  United States  Japan  United States 
1970  9.0 
1971  13.5 
1972  23.3 
1973  13.9 
1974  16.5 
1975  25.2 
1976  22.0 
1977  19.3 
1979  16.6 
1981  24.9 
1982  23.7 
1983  29.4 
1984  26.3 
1985  29.4 
1986  58.6 
1987  50.4 
1978  21.5 
1980  17.9 
































































































Sources: From French and Poterba (1989), who give original sources for the ratios. Entries reflect 
values on last trading day of  each year. The debt-equity ratio is defined as the book value of debt 
divided by  the market value of  equity. 
'French and Poterba's estimates 
reduced need for external financing of any sort after 1973. Each of these fac- 
tors will be discussed below. 
8.3  Equity Capital 
8.3.1  The Rate of Return on Equity: Stock Prices and Dividends 
The third of  the standard components of  the overall cost of  capital is the 
cost of equity financing, re in the standard equation. It is the most ambiguous 
of the  components to measure. One approach  has been  to use the realized 
market rate of return on equity, that is, the dividend/price ratio plus the rate of 
increase  of  equity  prices.  Baldwin  (1986) and  Ando and Auerbach  (1985) 
computed the overall return  to debt plus equity in what  are intended to be 
improvements  on the Hatsopoulos  ( 1983) approach  of  omitting equity alto- 
gether on the Japanese side of the calculation. They both found little evidence 233  Japanese Finance 
of  a difference  between  Japan and the United States.15 Ando and Auerbach 
(1985) found that the market rate of return to equity was in fact much higher 
in Japan (13.6% for the median of their sample of firms, vs. 2.2% for the U.S. 
firms). Subsequently,  on a much larger sample of  firms but  with a similar 
methodology and time period, Ando and Auerbach (1988) found that the over- 
all rate of  return on capital was substantially lower in Japan than in the United 
States after all.I6 
Stockholders' realized rate of return on equity is, in any case, a very noisy 
indicator of their ex ante expectations, however. Friend and Tokutsu (1987, p. 
317) pointed  out that, while realized  market rates of  return on equity have 
been higher in Japan (over the period  1962-84)  than in the United States, a 
reverse answer results if the dividendprice ratio is added to the rate of growth 
of  dividends per share, rather than to the rate of growth of prices. Further- 
more, looking at the problem from the viewpoint of the market investor rather 
than the firm might give the wrong answer if the stockholders'  return to capi- 
tal, measured over a finite sample, differs from what managers perceive  as 
their required rate of return.  Hatsopoulos and  Brooks  (1989) and Hodder 
(1988b,  1991) dissent from the Baldwin and Ando-Auerbach approaches on 
these grounds." 
In the absence of  a speculative bubble, stock prices can be thought of either 
as the present discounted value of  expected future dividends  or the present 
discounted value of expected future earnings (as a proxy for cash flow,I8  which 
is more correct, as explained in n. 21 below).  In both the United States and 
Japan the dividend payout rate (Div/E) is substantially less than 1,  which sug- 
gests that the expected rate of growth of dividends is greater than the expected 
rate of growth of earnings (properly averaged over the perhaps distant future). 
Many rapidly growing companies pay no dividends at all, for example, pre- 
ferring to reinvest  all earnings into highly profitable projects. I consider the 
subject of dividends first and then turn to earnings in the next subsection. 
There has been no upward trend in Japanese dividends per share over the 
last 20 years.I9 This makes it especially difficult to explain the high level of 
15. Baldwin (1986) computes a risk-return frontier for each country and finds little difference 
between the two; i.e., the level of  expected return for any given level of  risk is similar. Ando and 
Auerbach (1985) is based on a fairly small sample of firms (for the period 1966-81).  In addition 
to their calculation of the average rates of return, they also look at earningslprice ratios, discussed 
below. 
16. They found that the before-tax returns were 6.5 percent in Japan, 12.3 percent in the United 
States. After-tax returns were 2.5 percent vs. 5.6 percent. The time period was 1967-83. 
17. We save until later the argument that firms may have access to some funds that are cheaper 
than the expected rate of return on capital (that internal financing is cheaper than both the cost of 
debt and the cost of  equity). 
18. Free cash flow is defined as profit after tax minus changes in working capital minus other 
capital spending plus depreciation. 
19. Minimum dividend-payout rates were established in the early 1970s (Meerschwam, in this 
volume). 234  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Japanese stock prices, if one follows the common approach of  choosing the 
present-discounted-value-of-future-dividends  formula  and  estimating  ex- 
pected dividends from actual realized dividends.  On the other hand, the ob- 
served high  level  of  prices  relative to dividends  would  be perfectly  under- 
standable if the increase in dividends were thought still to lie in the future. If 
dividends are treated as expected to grow at a constant rate gd from now on, 
then  the current dividend/price  ratio should equal re -  gd, where re is the 
required rate of return on equity capital (which may be higher than the real 
interest rate because of a risk premium). As of 1988, the dividend price ratio 
was only .006 in Japan, as compared to .030 in the United States (third and 
fourth columns of table 8.1). If rr is assumed to be the same in the two coun- 
tries,  then  the current levels of  stock prices  make  sense if  and only if  the 
dividends are expected to grow at a rate 2.4  percent faster in Japan than in the 
United States. 
Why should Japanese dividends grow rapidly in the future, given that they 
have not done so in the past? We  have no good theory of  how shareholders 
wish to receive the return on their equity investment, that is, in the form of 
dividends or capital gains, or of how managers choose to pay dividends. In a 
sufficiently abstract  (Modigliani-Miller)  world  the payout rate  is indetermi- 
nate. On the one hand, tax considerations point to postponing the payment of 
dividends. On the other hand, the hypothesis  that managers  sometimes use 
funds for purposes other than maximizing shareholder welfare points to share- 
holders insisting on early payment of dividends.  But dividends do get paid, 
and one hypothesis is that some shareholders like to receive quarterly checks 
for liquidity reasons. They could instead sell some stock to generate cash, but 
there are transactions costs to doing so. The ratio of retirees to working-age 
people is close to a minimum in Japan now, and will soon begin to rise until, 
by 2020, it will be the highest of the major industrialized countries. It is en- 
tirely plausible that wealthy Japanese retirees in the future will wish to receive 
high dividend payments on their holdings. Thus it is not entirely implausible 
that the expected future growth rate of dividends in Japan should be almost as 
high as the rate of return on capital,  or that it  should be 2.4 percent higher 
than the growth rate in the United States, notwithstanding the dividend record 
of the past 20 years. 
An  alternative  approach is to look at the amount of  earnings the  firm is 
required to generate per unit of equity, that is, the inverse of the price/earnings 
ratio. If one is trying to determine whether the Japanese stock market may be 
overvalued, looking at earnings or cash flow has the advantage that they may 
be tied more directly to the productive capacity of the economy, as compared 
to dividends.*O 
20. Lawler, Loopesko, and Dudey (1988, p. 25) point out that the Japanese rate of growth of 
earnings per share need not be correlated with the rate of growth of the Japanese economy. On the 
other hand, dividends would appear to be  one step further removed than  are  earnings, via the 
(difficult to determine) procedure whereby firms set their payout rates. 235  Japanese Finance 
8.3.2  Price-Earnings Ratios 
The price/earnings ratio (like the priceldividend ratio) has been observed to 
be  higher in Japan than in the United States ever since the early 1970s. Be- 
cause this difference could be explained by  a lower discount rate in Japan, it 
is often the basis of arguments that the cost of equity capital is lower in Japan. 
But the difference could also have other explanations, such as a higher ex- 
pected growth rate in Japan. If a high growth rate were the complete explana- 
tion, one would not want to attribute the high P/E ratios to a low discount rate. 
More broadly, one would not want to attribute the superior performance of 
Japanese industry necessarily to a low cost of capital. The paper now turns to 
the subject of  the high and increasing P/E ratios in Japan, an important ques- 
tion in its own right. 
Some, such as Ando and Auerbach, have looked at the PIE ratio because 
they are interested in the cost-of-capital question, and they consider P/E to be 
inversely related to the required rate of return re.  Others, such as French and 
Poterba (1989) and Lawler, Loopesko, and Dudey (1988) are interested in the 
P/E ratio for its own sake. As shown in the first two columns of  table 8.1, the 
reported P/E ratio for Japanese firms has been higher than the P/E ratio in 
the United States ever since 1972, and reached 58.6, three times as high as the 
U.S. level, in 1986. In the stock market crash of October 1987, the decline in 
Japan was smaller and shorter-lived, with the result that, by the end of  1988, 
Japan’s reported P/E was more than four times that in the United States or the 
rest of the world (see fig. 8.2.) 
Such an apparent discrepancy would be difficult to explain. If earnings are 
expected  to  grow  at  rate  ge, then  the  eamings/price  ratio  should  equal 
r, - ge. The end-1988 differential between reported earnings/price ratios in 
the United States and Japan was .06[ = .078 - ,0181. The real growth rate 
of the Japanese economy averaged 1.56 percent faster than the U.S. economy 
over 1980-88;  there is no particular reason to expect the real growth rate of 
the economy to increase in the future, or to expect the growth rate of earnings 
or cash flow to be higher than the growth rate of GNP. Thus the rate of return 
on capital re would have to be more than 4 percentage points lower than in the 
United States to explain the difference in reported P/E ratios. Such a finding 
would support the cost-of-capital-advantage school, but seems too large to be 
plausible.  * 
French and Poterba (1989), Ando and Auerbach (1985, 1988), and Lawler, 
Loopesko,  and Dudey  (1988), all emphasize the importance of  correcting 
earnings for a number of measurement problems. Ando and Auerbach (1985) 
focus on three distortions related to inflation: depreciation accounting, inven- 
21. As mentioned above, a more correct calculation would use free cash flow,  which subtracts 
off  investment,  in place of earnings. More of earnings go to net investment in Japan than in  the 
United States, in line with its higher growth rate. The implication is that the true  equity cost of 
capital r. is even lower in Japan than would appear from our attempt to apply the capitalization 
formula to the P/E ratio. 236  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
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Fig. 8.2  Pricelearnings ratios 
Source; Lawler, Loopesko,  and Dudey (1988) 
tory  accounting, and accounting for nominal  liabilities.  They find that cor- 
recting  for these distortions increases estimated earnings, and therefore  re- 
duces the P/E ratio, for virtually all the Japanese firms in their sample, while 
it has no systematic effect for the U.S. firms.22  The principal apparent source 
of  the effect  is that the Japanese firms rely  more on debt than equity  (see 
above), so the fact that inflation reduces the real value of their outstanding 
liabilities  is more important for them.23  If this  is indeed the source of  the 
effect, then the fact that the debvequity ratio in Japan appears to have fallen 
22. When Ando and Auerbach (1988) apply a corresponding correction for their measure of 
total return to capital, on the other hand, they find that the median rate for Japan falls more than 
that for the United States. 
23. Apparently the fact that the inflation rate is lower in Japan has less of an effect than the 
higher debtkquity ratio. 237  Japanese Finance 
below that in the United States in 1986 (and that inflation fell in both countries 
in the 1980s), suggests that the inflation accounting may no longer be as im- 
portant for the P/E comparison. 
French and Poterba (1989) have some other corrections to make to reported 
earnings and, therefore, P/E ratios. First is the point that earnings reported by 
U.S. corporations include the profits of subsidiaries, while those reported by 
Japanese firms do not (only actual dividends received from subsidiaries), so 
their earnings look smaller. A calculation to convert P/E ratios to what they 
would be if there were no cross-holding of corporate equity (which requires 
adjusting  both  earnings  by  removing  intercorporate dividends  and  share 
prices) reduces the Japanese P/E ratio. In 1988 the adjustment is big enough 
to reduce it from 54.3 to 36.3. 
Second, reported Japanese earnings also look smaller because they deduct 
(both on the firms’ tax returns and on their financial statements) generous 
allowances for special reserves for such possible future contingencies as prod- 
uct returns, repairs, and retirement benefits. But this effect is relatively small. 
Third, Japanese firms often take greater depreciation allowances, which, 
like the previous two factors, works to reduce reported earnings. (Unlike U.S. 
firms, when a Japanese firm claims a high depreciation allowance for tax pur- 
poses,  it  must  do the same on  its income statement.) French  and Poterba 
(1989) consider two alternate ways of correcting for the difference in depre- 
ciation accounting (see table 8.2). 
The effect of  all three corrections together is to reduce the 1988 P/E ratio 
from 54.3 to either 23.2 or 32.1, depending on which depreciation correction 
is used. Lawler et al. (1988, p. 24) make their own adjustments for deprecia- 
tion and consolidation of earnings, which produce a very similar result (see 
figs. 8.3 and 8.4). The analogous downward adjustment in U.S. P/E ratios is 
much smaller. Overall, these accounting differences in earnings explain about 
half  of  the difference between  Japanese and U.S.  This still leaves 
Japanese equities about twice as high as U.S. equities. Or, if our interest is in 
the cost-of-capital question rather than in the is-Japan’s-market-too-high  ques- 
tion,  the correction  still leaves Japanese earnings/price ratios at about half 
U.S. levels. 
Once we get the corrected Japanese earnings/price ratio up to the neighbor- 
hood of  .04, it becomes slightly easier to explain the differential vis-a-vis the 
United States (which is at  .09 when  similarly adjusted by  French and Po- 
terba). If, for example, the expected rate of  growth of earnings ge in Japan 
were 2.5 percent faster than in the U.S. and the required rate of  return were 
2.5 percent lower, that would explain the differential. But if it is true that the 
24. When Aron (1989) converts the Japanese P/E ratio to U.S.  accounting practices, and adjusts 
for cross-holding, he  lowers it from a reported 49.6 in 1989 to  19.1 (compared to  13.5 in the 
United States). 238  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 8.2  Adjusted PIE Ratios, Japan, 1975-88 
Depreciation Adjustment 
Method  1  Method 2 
Cross-Holding 
Unadjusted  Reserves 































































































































Source: French and Poterba (1989). Their calculations are described in the text. The unadjusted PIE ratio 
corresponds to the NRI 350  index. 
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required rate of  return is lower by,  say 2.5 percentage points,  what might be 
the source of this difference? 
We  consider in  turn  three  possibilities:  more  favorable  tax  treatment,  a 
lower real interest rate, and internal financing that is cheaper than the market 
interest rate. In the end, the paper will favor the third explanation, especially 239  Japanese Finance 
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for the period before liberalization, together with the second explanation, es- 
pecially for the period since liberalization.  25 
8.3.3  Corporate Taxation 
Corporate taxation is one of the respects in which the effective cost of cap- 
ital facing the firm can differ from the observed rate of return on investment: 
25. There is a fourth possibility, that the “equity premium’’ (defined as the expected rate of 
return on equity minus the interest rate) is smaller for Japan, which would in theory require that 
the Japanese stock market be less risky than the American stock market. Ueda (1990, pp. 362- 
64)  argues that the risk premium in the Japanese stock market declined sharply between 1982 and 
1988, but can find little evidence of a corresponding decline in riskiness. Lawler, Loopesko, and 
Dudey (1988, pp. 26-27)  conclude that uncertainty in the two stock markets was roughly similar 
in the late 1980s (despite some possible differences in the past), whether estimated from the stan- 
dard deviations of monthly changes or expected volatilities implicit in stock index options. (Bald- 
win  1986 and the appendix to Ando and Auerbach  1988 find no sign that the expected rate of 
return on Japanese securities is lower, even for a given amount of risk.) 240  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
it is of  course the after-tax  cost of  capital that should matter for investment 
decisions. It would presumably be more convenient for any American busi- 
nessman who wished to claim that Japanese industry had  an “unfair advan- 
tage” in the form of a low cost of capital, if the source of the advantage were 
more favorable tax treatment by  the Japanese government. In the past, the 
corporate income tax rate in Japan has been much higher than in the United 
States,  especially after the more favorable U.S.  tax  treatment of  business 
adopted in 1981, or even than in other countries such as the United Kingdom, 
which cut its corporate tax rate in  1984 (Hale 1987, p.  1). In  1985, the Japa- 
nese government raised 5.9 percent of  its tax revenue from corporations, as 
compared to only 2.1 percent in the United  States (Shoven 1989; see also 
Noguchi 1985). This has made it difficult to claim a tax advantage for Japanese 
industry.26 
Indeed,  when  Ando  and  Auerbach  (1985) computed after-tax earnings/ 
price ratios and after-tax return-to-capital rates, they found that “it is Japa- 
nese, not American, firms that are taxed more heavily on their real incomes” 
(p. 25). They registered two possible qualifications. First, one would prefer 
to look at the marginal effective tax rates that are relevant to the firm’s decision 
whether to invest, rather than the average tax rate; but they noted that such 
measures were unavailable for Japan. Second, their calculations apply to the 
unlevered firm, but a corporation derives tax advantages from borrowing since 
interest payments are tax deductible, and one might expect these advantages 
to be larger for Japanese firms (both because they have had higher debtlequity 
ratios until recently and because the corporate tax rate that they are deducting 
against is higher). But Ando and Auerbach compute an upper bound on this 
tax advantage, and claim that it is very small. Thus they feel able to “rule out” 
the claim that the corporate tax system gives Japanese firms a cost-of-capital 
advantage (p. 37). Noguchi (1985), taking into account the advantages of bor- 
rowing, also concludes that the tax burden is higher on Japanese, not U.S., 
corporations. 
Other authors have ascribed more importance to the tax advantages of bor- 
rowing in Japan.  Hatsopoulos and Brooks (1989), for example, emphasize 
that the definition of tax-deductible borrowing is more permissive in the Jap- 
anese tax code than in the American. 
Bernheim and Shoven (1  986) dispute the prevailing approach in public fi- 
nance of  presupposing that the  (pretax) real  interest rate must be constant 
across countries, in light of the observed failure of this condition. They first 
compute the after-tax cost of capital under the 1980 tax codes, using the actual 
interest rates and inflation rates that  held on average for the  1970s (which 
entails assuming a U.S.-Japan real interest differential of  1.5 percent). They 
26. The paper treats separately the possibility that favorable treatment of saving in the Japanese 
tax system has been one of the causes of high household saving in Japan. This effect, if it existed, 
would operate via a low real interest rate. 241  Japanese Finance 
find a smaller tax wedge on capital in Japan than in the United States, with the 
result that the after-tax cost of capital in Japan is negati~e.~’  They attributed 
this result to the greater importance of interest payments (tax deductible, on a 
nominal basis) in Japan. 
Bernheim and Shoven then repeat the computations for  1985 tax  codes, 
using the actual interest and inflation rates for the early 1980s. Despite the 
adoption of accelerated depreciation allowances in the U.S. tax code in 198  1, 
the estimated U.S. cost of  capital rises substantially in the 1980s as a result, 
particularly, of the much higher real interest rate (5.0 percent, as compared to 
2.0 percent in the 1970~).~~  The real interest rate was higher in Japan as well, 
but there remains a substantial difference in the after-tax costs of  capital in 
1985 (5.48 for the U.S. vs. 2.76 for Japan). 
The central message of  Bernheim and  Shoven was  that variation in real 
interest rates tends to dwarf variation in corporate tax laws as determinants of 
the cost of capital. They include in this message the changes in the 1986 tax 
reform (including the removal of the investment tax credit that had been in- 
creased in 1981), which was under debate at the time that they were writing. 
Fukao (1988, pp. 339-41)  finds a larger tax wedge (less negative) for Japan 
than the United States during the period 198 1-84  but also finds that the com- 
bination of  the  1986 U.S.  tax reform and lower inflation rates brought the 
post-1986 tax wedge in the United States very close to that in Japan. 
In December 1988, the Japanese Diet approved a tax reform that had been 
long sought by the ruling Liberal Democratic party. The reform, among other 
things, cut the Japanese corporate tax rate from 42  percent to 37.5 percent 
(with the full cut not effective until  1990).29  This leaves the tax rate only 
slightly higher than the current rates in the United States (34 percent) or the 
United Kingdom (35  Shoven (1989) updates his calculations of the 
effective tax rates on corporate investment. He finds that the effective tax rate 
on investments in Japan is up sharply to 32 percent in 1988 (as compared to 5 
percent in 1980). Part of the reason is the tax reform: in Shoven’s calculations 
(unlike Ando and Auerbach 1985), the high average corporate tax rate in Ja- 
pan worked to reduce the effective marginal tax rate on new investment, be- 
cause it  increased the value to the corporation of  borrowing to finance the 
27. Consistent with the findings of Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988). 
28. Bernheim and Shoven artificially boost the U.S. real interest rate for the  1970s up a bit, 
because it was in fact observed to be negative, which would “wreak havoc” with the methodology 
that they adopt to evaluate tax systems. 
29. The tax rate on undistributed profits during the period 1984-87  was 43.3 percent (Homma, 
Maeda, and Hashimoto 1986, p. 14; Homma 1987, p. 21). However,  it had been lower in the 
1950s and 1960s, ranging from 35 percent to 40 percent (Homma et al.  1984, p. 124, table 2.39; 
Shoven and Tachibanaki 1988, table 3.6). 
30. When state and  local taxes on corporations are  added in, the  Japanese rate  is about 50 
percent and the U.S. rate about 40 percent. These numbers are taken from Shoven (1989). One of 
several motives for the Japanese tax reform is that the Ministry of Finance fears that, in the ab- 
sence of international harmonization of corporate tax rates, business would increasingly be able 
to find ways to arbitrage across tax jurisdictions. 242  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
investment and then deducting the interest payments from its taxable income. 
He thus estimates that the reduction in the average corporate tax rate in itself 
raised the effective tax rate 9 percentage points. 
The major reason for the increase in the marginal effective tax rate on in- 
vestment is not the tax reform, however, but rather the sharp decline in ex- 
pected inflation relative to the 1970s. This decline is estimated to have raised 
the effective tax rate by 23 percentage points. The fall in the inflation rate in 
Japan (from 9 percent  in the  1970s to  1 percent) means that the favorable 
distortion caused by the tax deductibility of nominal interest payments is re- 
duced. This leaves the effective Japanese tax rate still somewhat below the 
U.S. rate, which was at 41 percent in 1988 (up from 29 percent before the Tax 
Reform Act of  1986). 
It is possible that the moderate tax advantage that remains in Shoven’s num- 
bers does not adequately take into account the downward trend in the Japanese 
reliance on debt,31  and that by now little is left of the Japanese tax advantage. 
Ando and Auerbach (1985, 1988) dismissed the importance, in this context, 
of taxes alt~gether.~~  Bernheim and Shoven (1986, p. 3) concluded that “under 
prevailing tax systems, differences in the cost of capital between countries are 
largely attributable to differences in domestic credit market conditions, rather 
than to taxes.” Since the time that these two papers were written, the differ- 
ence in tax treatment between the two countries has, if  anything, narrowed. 
(At the same time that the U.S.  tax reform of  1986 rolled back investment 
incentives for U.S. firms, the Japanese tax reforms that took effect in April of 
1988 and April of 1989 raised the tax rate on Japanese saving in a number of 
If the public finance experts think that taxes are of, at best, second- 
order importance in comparing the cost of capital between the United States 
and Japan-or  that the difference has, if anything, gone against Japanese cor- 
porations-why  should international economists disagree? 
8.3.4  Total Stock Market Capitalization and the Late-1980s Run-up 
The empirical fact that dominates the study of Japan’s stock market is the 
tremendous run-up in  prices since  1970, especially in  the  1980s. We  have 
3 1. Recall the figures from French and Poterba (1989) that by  1988 the debtiequity ratio in 
Japan had  fallen below that in the United States. Noguchi (1985, pp. 9,  18) lists the fall in the 
debuequity ratio as one of several reason why the tax burden on Japanese investment increased in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s (though, like Ando and Auerbach, Noguchi thinks that the Japanese 
burden has been higher than the U.S. burden all along). The most important of  the reasons (as 
with Shoven 1989) is the fall in the inflation rate. 
32. Takenaka (1986) concludes that the impact of the investment tax credit on Japanese invest- 
ment is negligible. 
33. The previously existing prosaving bias in the Japanese tax system, compared to the Ameri- 
can system, constituted part of the difference in “tax wedges” computed by Bernheim and Shoven 
(1986). It is discussed below under the topic of determinants of the real interest rate in Japan. 
Iwata and Yoshida (1987) calculated that the abolition of the prosaving bias in the then-proposed 
reforms would increase the total tax wedge in Japan (and thereby narrow the differential in the 
corporate  cost of  capital  vis-a-vis  the United States), despite  the accompanying reductions  in 
Japanese corporate taxes. (They, unlike Shoven, find that the latter work to reduce the after-tax 
cost of capital in Japan.) 243  Japanese Finance 
already discussed the level of stock prices when they are compared to divi- 
dends and when they are compared to earnings. The same trend is evident 
when comparing total capitalization (price times number of  shares) in Japan 
to capitalization in the United States. 
Total  stock  market capitalization  in  Japan had,  by  1989, surpassed the 
United States: 44 percent of the world versus 29 percent, in the conventional 
But market values need to be adjusted for the double counting that 
results from intercorporate share ownership. Nearly two-thirds of  corporate 
equity  in  Japan  is held  by  other  corporations.  When  French and  Poterba 
(1989) adjust the Japanese market for cross-holdings, they find that it is still 
smaller than the United States: 33 percent of the world capitalization versus 
36 percent for the United States. When McDonald (1989) adjusted for cross- 
holdings (or rnochiui in Japanese) he found, as of early 1989, that the Japanese 
market was indeed larger than the U.S. market: 39 percent versus 33 percent. 
But the ranking again reversed with the fall of Japanese stock prices in early 
1990. In any case, the growth of the Japanese market in the 1980s is astound- 
ing by any measure (a 68-fold increase over 1970). 
French and Poterba observe that the magnitude of  the 1986-88  run-up in 
the stock market is equally impressive when measured relative to GNP. Their 
computed ratio of  adjusted equity to GNP fluctuated between  .14 and  .33 
during the period 1970-85 and then rose sharply to .68 by  1988. (Meanwhile, 
the U.S.  ratio,  though more than twice as high as the Japanese ratio in  the 
early 1970s, was only .49 in 1988.) 
The only ratio where French and Poterba do not find potentially explosive 
behavior is the ratio of equity prices to the replacement cost of capital, that is, 
Tobin’s Q. They do find that the Q ratio in Japan increased about 35 percent 
from 1973 to 1987, to .67 or .77, depending on the method of calculating net 
equity outstanding. But the U.S. ratio, at .71, is in about the same range. The 
fact that the replacement cost of capital in Japan has increased almost as much 
as stock market prices is tentatively attributed by  French and Poterba to the 
fact that land prices have almost doubled since 1983 and the fact that compa- 
nies hold a lot of land.35  They thus tentatively conclude that the puzzle as to 
why equity prices rose so much in the  1980s may be the same as the puzzle 
why land prices rose so much in the 1980s. (See comparison of stock prices 
and land prices in major cities in fig. 8.5.)36 
34. Hale (1989) opines that the dramatic reversal of the rankings of U.S.  and Japanese capitali- 
zation over the course of the 1980s  represents the financial market’s negative judgment on Reagan- 
omics as compared to policy-making  by  bureaucrats  in the Japanese Ministry of  Finance.  But 
when Murphy (1989) observes the same reversal, he worries that Japan’s policymakers are not 
ready to accept the responsibility of greater weight in the world. 
35. Japanese companies usually carry land on their books, not at current market price, but at 
the price of acquisition (which, in the case of land held since the nineteenth century, is essentially 
zero). 
36. Ueda (1990, p. 357) finds that the market value of corporate shares after 1983 surpassed the 
reported value of corporate assets including land. But the final version of the paper does not rule 
out the possibility that land prices explain the rise in stock prices, in light of claims that official 
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Fig. 8.5  Real Japanese urban land prices and real Tokyo Stock Index 
Source: Lawler, Loopesko, and Dudey (1988). 
Note:  Both series deflated by an index of consumer prices. 
*Index of urban land prices, six largest cities, commercial area. 
8.3.5  Land Prices 
The soaring price of land in Japan is a major phenomenon in its own right. 
In 1986 the price of land in Tokyo (for residential use) was 150  times the price 
in New York,  16 times the price in London, 35 times in Paris, and 11 times in 
Munich (Iwata and Yoshida 1988, p. 509). The unit cost of  land for the coun- 
try overall was about 40 times as high as in the U.S.37  Thus the value of all the 
land in Japan is several times as great as the value of all the land in the (much 
larger) United  A favorite “factoid,” which is apparently true, is that 
the grounds of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, when evaluated at the land prices 
of the adjoining Otemachi area, is worth more than all the land in the State of 
California (see, e.g., Boone and Sachs 1989; Boone 1989b). 
The price of land, analogously to the price of equity, should equal the pres- 
ent discounted value of future rents (in the absence of a speculative bubble). 
If rents are expected to grow at rate gr,  then the pricehental  ratio should be 
given by 
37. Ito (1989). In 1987, the average price of usable land in Japan was 90 times that in the United 
38. In 1984, the value of  land in Japan was 3.17 times GNP, while in the United States it was 
States, according to Boom (1989a). 
only .SO times GNP (Sachs and Boone 1988). 245  Japanese Finance 
1 
P,,,/rent  = ~. 
r -  gr 
Thus the same possible explanations arise for high land prices as arise for high 
equity prices: a low discount rate r or a high growth rate gr. Noguchi (1987, 
as described by It0 1989) observes that the pricekental ratio is much higher in 
Tokyo than in other major world cities,39  and concludes that about half of the 
Japanese land price is a speculative bubble, that the demand for land is based 
on a self-confirming expectation of future capital gains. But It0 (1989) dis- 
agrees, arguing that Noguchi omits the possibility that expectations of rising 
land prices could be correctly based on fundamentals, because the relative 
price of land will increase in a growing economy where the supply of land is 
fixed by geographical and other fact01-s.~~ 
In terms of the above equation, gr could be high. Ito shows in an overlap- 
ping generations model, in which land is a substitutable factor of production, 
that if land is in fixed supply, its relative price will increase at a rate essentially 
given by the real growth rate of the economy. Boone and Sachs (1989) argue 
similarly. Boone (1989b) concludes that one can explain the difference be- 
tween Japanese and U.S.  land values by  fundamentals if  Japanese GNP is 
expected to grow at roughly 2 percent a year faster than U.S. GNP. 
The institutional factors that are listed in note 40 above are often cited as 
causes of the high cost of land in Japan. They are one component of the Struc- 
tural Impediments Initiative (SII) launched by the U.S. government in  1989, 
on the theory that the high cost of  land is in turn a cause of low consumption 
and low  imports in Japan. But in the absence of  macroeconomic differences 
like  interest rates and expectations,  these institutional factors could  not  in 
themselves explain the high price of  land. In the first place, Boone (1989a) 
studies data across regions of Japan and finds that factors such as excess con- 
centration in the Tokyo region, agricultural protection, and tax policies cannot 
explain differences in land costs.  In  the second place, even if these institu- 
tional factors could explain the high cost of land in Japan overall, they cannot 
serve as an explanation for the high pricekental ratio. As Boone (1989a, p. 
14) notes, they would predict that, not only land prices in Tokyo, but rents as 
well, should far exceed those in other world capitals, which is not the case. 
The expected-growth argument favored by  both Boone and Ito tells us why 
land pricehental ratios in Japan are currently high. But it does not tell us why 
they should have increased so much over the last 18 years. In the theory, with 
39. It is about five times higher than London. Boone (1989a, p. 47) estimates that the price of 
land in Tokyo is 150 times that in New York, despite little difference in rental rates on apartments 
and buildings. 
40. There are a number of special institutional features that affect the Japanese land market, 
such as building height restrictions and sunshine laws, special protection for rice paddies, and a 
level of taxation of  capital gains at the time of sale that is much greater than annual property taxes 
(on the last point, see K. Takagi 1989). Some of these features can be viewed as contributing to 
the inelasticity of  the supply of land. 246  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
growth in the economy, the price and rent should each rise proportionately. 
Instead, while land and housing prices have skyrocketed, the rental rate has 
remained approximately constant in real terms (see the last four lines of table 
8.3). The pricekental ratio for housing increased by 67 percent between 1970 
and 1987.41 
8.3.6  Speculative Bubbles 
There is always the possibility of a speculative bubble in the 1980s, to ex- 
plain the price of land, the price of equity, or both. It is sometimes argued that 
special institutional features of the Japanese stock market, such as the domi- 
nance of trading by the big four security firms and administrative guidance by 
the Ministry of  keep prices artificially high. It has been argued, for 
example, that such features might explain why the Japanese market “was not 
allowed” to fall as far in the crash of October 1987 as were other countries’ 
markets (Lawler, Loopesko,  and Dudey  1988, pp.  31-33;  Murphy  1989). 
Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1989, p.  19) find that “margin requirements in 
Japan have proved to be an effective tool of controlling wild gyrations in stock 
prices.” But financial economists have not yet been  able to construct good 
models of  what gets speculative bubbles started or what causes them to col- 
lapse. We do not even have much idea whether bubbles are more or less likely 
in perfectly competitive “efficient” markets than in markets where trading is 
characterized by turnover taxes, larger transactions costs, oligopolistic market 
makers, and government intervention (all characteristics that are sometimes 
attributed to Japanese stock markets)  .43 
It is possible that some short-term movements in financial markets repre- 
sent speculative bubbles. But before we do anything so radical as attributing 
the longer-term movement in Japan’s equity and land prices to a speculative 
bubble, we return to the possibility of a low discount rate in Japan. 
8.4  Determinants of the Real Interest Rate 
If one thinks of the real interest rate as equilibrating the various sources and 
uses of funds, then a low real interest rate would be explained by  some com- 
41. The price of land alone went up even more than the price of housing over this same period. 
The price/rental ratio for land increased by  14 percent between 1975 and 1986 (27 percent in the 
three big cities). The source is Iwata and Yoshida (1988, p. 510). Ito’s (1989) theory may, how- 
ever, give us a reason why land priceirental ratios in Japan should be higher than in the United 
States, even aside from any difference in real growth rates of the economies. It0 shows that if the 
supply of available land increases at the growth rate of the economy, then the relative price of land 
will be constant. In terms of the equation, if the supply of land is more elastic in the United States 
than in Japan, then gr will be lower, and, therefore, P,,,/rent  will be lower in the United States. 
42. The Ministry of Finance began to look after the stability of the Japanese stock market after 
a crash in 1965. S. Takagi (1989) discusses the history and institutional features of the market. 
43. Agganval, Rao, and Hiraki (1990) have found evidence in the Tokyo Stock Exchange that 
stocks with low P/E ratios have higher returns than stocks with high P/E ratios (as others have 
found in the United States.) Seasonal anomalies have also been found. 247  Japanese Finance 
Table 8.3  Increases in Prices of Nontraded Services in Tokyo 
Ratio of  19871 
Category  1972 Prices 
Electric light  1.72 
Gas  2.39 
Water  5.83 
Mail  4.10 
Phone  1  .oo 
Freight  3.46 
Rail  3.89 
Tramcar  7.00 
Bus  5.33 
Newspaper  3.15 
Receiving fee  2.24 
Cinema  2.14 
Telegram  2.22 
Bathing  5.93 
Hairdressing  4.04 
Cleaning  2.49 
Lodging  2.40 
House price  3.40 
House rental  2.29 
Tokyo CPI (prewar base)  2.47 
National CPI  2.45 
Source: Economic Szutistics Annual, Bank  of Japan (March 1988), pp. 329-30,  except for “house 
price” and “house rental,” which are from lwata and Yoshida (1988), p. 510. 
bination of four factors: a high corporate saving rate net of investment, a high 
public saving rate, a high household saving rate, or a high availability of sav- 
ings from abroad. Each factor probably has played a role at one time or an- 
other in Japan. 
We  know that the government was a source of cheap capital for many firms 
in the 1950s and 1960s, but that it went sharply into deficit and became a big 
user of  funds after 1973. The Ministry of  Finance took pains to cut the gov- 
ernment budget deficit in the early 1980s, but the deficit has nevertheless been 
relatively high throughout the post-1973 period and thus cannot explain a low 
real interest rate during this period.44  The corporate sector was in deficit in the 
postwar period until the first oil shock. We know that the corporate deficit has 
been  sharply lower since then,45  as the result of  a fall-off in the previously 
44. It is easy enough to explain the real interest differential and international capital flows vis- 
a-vis the United States in the early 1980s by the U.S. fiscal expansion. 
45. Indeed, Balassa and Noland (1988, p. 84) report that the Japanese corporate sector was in 
surplus in the years 1974-77,  although others show only a declining deficit (where both financial 
and nonfinancial corporations are included; Lincoln 1988, table 3-2, pp. 76-77). 248  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
high level of  investment (which helps explain the extension of  the period of 
cheap capital well past 1973). But the high Japanese private saving rate is the 
factor most often cited as applying throughout the period. 
8.4.1  Household Saving Rate 
The Japanese household saving rate, at 23.0 percent of disposable income 
averaged over 1970-86,  is among the highest among the industrialized coun- 
tries. Other figures for comparison are the United States at 11.5 percent, the 
United Kingdom at 10.4 percent, and France at 17.7 percent (Blades 1988, p. 
18). The question of why the saving rate is so high in Japan is another major 
topic in itself. We  briefly run through some of  the arguments that have been 
suggested.46 
Hayashi (1986) claims that much of  the apparent differential in  personal 
saving rates between Japan and the United States can be explained by  four 
accounting differences. But even after adjustment, a substantial differential 
remains  .47 
At least six reasons for the high Japanese saving rate have been given, by 
Hayashi, Horioka, and others. 
1. A  high growth  rate. The  older dissaving generation are always out- 
weighed by the younger saving generati~n.~~ 
2. Demographics. Currently, Japan has one of the longest life expectancies 
and smallest ratio of aged to working-age population (15 percent, vs. 20 per- 
cent in the United States and 23 percent over all the OECD c~untries).~~  Ho- 
rioka (1986) has estimated that the age ratio can explain a difference in saving 
rates of  11.5 percent. 
An  additional possible explanation for the high saving rate in Japan-not 
one of the six explanations that appear on standard lists-is  that it is the most 
nonnuclear country of the G-5. Slemrod (1988) points out that a higher per- 
ceived threat of  nuclear annihilation should reduce people’s saving rate by 
reducing their expected horizons, and he offers supporting evidence from a 
cross-section of 20 countries.  Survey results show that Americans report a 
46. Horioka (1990) offers the most up-to-date and comprehensive of  a number of surveys. 
47. According to Blades (1988, pp.  18-19),  adjusting for consumer durables in 1986 raises the 
U.S.  household gross saving ratio from 11.5  percent to 22.1 percent, while only raising the Japa- 
nese ratio from 21.2 percent to 25.8 percent. When the saving ratios are averaged over 1970-86, 
adjusting raises the U.S. ratio to 23.6 percent and the Japanese ratio to 26.1 percent.  See also 
Balassa and Noland (1988, pp. 80-96).  Takayama et al. (1988) go so far as to say, on the basis of 
several accounting corrections, that the Japanese saving rate is not high at all. 
48. As in the life-cycle hypothesis of Franco Modigliani. 
49. Over the next 30 years, Japan will go from having the highest ratio of  working age popula- 
tion to elderly out of the G-5 countries (5.9 in 1985) to the lowest (2.3 in 2020; see Shoven 1989). 
A simulation by Auerbach et al. (1989, p. 117), based on the rapid aging of the Japanese popula- 
tion, predicts that the national saving rate in Japan will decline from 22 percent (close to Ger- 
many’s) to a minimum of 1 percent, over the period 1990 to 2028 (falling below the U.S. national 
saving rate in the year 2020). 249  Japanese Finance 
higher perceived likelihood of  world war than do the Japanese, and, indeed, 
Americans report the highest of all 20 countries.50 
3. An underdeveloped social security system. There are conflicting effects 
on the saving rate,J1  and Horioka argues that they approximately cancel out. 
4. The bonus system of  employee compensation. The lump-sum payments 
at the end of each half-year might act as forced saving. This would require a 
sort of “calendar illusion.” But Ishikawa and Ueda (1984) find that the bonus 
system does indeed have an effect on saving (though they estimate it to be at 
most three percentage points). 
5. The high price of  land and housing. Even before recent price increases 
(1985-87),  housing prices in Japan were almost twice as high as those in the 
United States. They are 2.5 to 2.7 times higher if differences in floor space are 
taken into account (Horioka 1988, p. 218). As a result, housing constitutes 65 
percent of  saving in  Japan as compared to  31 percent in the United States 
(Frankel 1988b, n. 33). 
By itself, the saving implications of expensive housing are not as clear as 
often asserted.52  But a positive effect on saving does follow from the unavail- 
ability of  consumer credit; Hayashi, Ito, and Slemrod (1988) report that the 
Japanese have to accumulate up to 40 percent of the purchase price as a down 
payment.53  Also, mortgage interest is not tax deductible as it is in the United 
States. The Japanese appear to have a greater cultural bias against personal 
indebtedness than do Americans; rather than using credit cards to postpone 
payment for purchases, for example, the Japanese are fond of magnetic cards 
that allow them to prepay and then deduct purchases as they are made.54 
50. Not taken into account is any tendency for the Japanese to rate their odds of  nuclear annihi- 
lation, conditional on world war breaking out, as lower than Americans. 
51. On the one hand low Social Security benefits encourage workers to save more, but on the 
other it encourages them to retire early. 
52. Sachs and Boone (1988) construct a model to answer the question of what would happen to 
saving if land prices fell, in response, for example, to the sorts of measures often urged on Japan 
by Americans: the ending of prohibitions on rice imports and the liberalization of land-use restric- 
tions.  Their model  predicts  that saving  would rise rather than fall, due to the fall in wealth. 
Similarly, Shibuya (1988) estimates that the wealth effect would nearly eliminate any positive 
effects of  land prices on saving; and Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) show that the estimated posi- 
tive effect of  higher land prices on saving by  future home buyers may be more than offset by 
estimated reductions in saving on the part of those who abandon plans ever to buy a home. 
53. Horioka (1988, p. 219) reports that Japanese familiesplun down-payment ratios of 45 to 55 
percent,  but that actual down payments are as low as 20 percent.  He argues (p. 229) that an 
increase in the availability of mortgage  credit would not increase total saving, but would only 
result  in a combination of  lower prepurchase  saving (to make the down payment) and higher 
postpurchase saving (to pay off the loan). 
54. Arguing against the idea that Japanese are culturally predisposed to save more is the fact 
that the high saving rates are only a phenomenon of the postwar era (as pointed out by Hale 1987, 
p. 26 and Balassa and Noland 1988, p. 81). Also sometimes listed as reasons for high saving rates 
in Japan are obstacles to consumption such as the inefficient retailing system, the lack of space in 
living quarters for consumer durables, and the lack of  leisure time in the work schedule (see, e.g., 
Balassa and Noland  1988, p. 94). But economic theory is dubious as to the implications for the 250  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Balassa and Noland (1988, p. 92) argue that a special combination of  high 
housing prices and the strategic bequest motive on the part of the elderly are 
the best  explanation of  high  saving.55  Horioka (1985,  1988) reports that, 
while opinion surveys in the United States report old age as the most impor- 
tant motive for saving, surveys in Japan place saving to buy a house as more 
important (together with education and marriage). Horioka (1986) estimates 
that high land prices explain a difference in saving rates of 5.0 percent.56 
6. Tax incentives. In the past, the tax system has deliberately increased the 
after-tax return to households in a number of ways. The Japanese could escape 
paying taxes on much of their savings by taking advantage of such exemptions 
as deposits in the maruyu system and the Postal Savings System. A family of 
four could legally hold $455,000  in  tax-free  The 1987 tax reform, 
effective April  1988, abolished the tax-exempt savings accounts. But it did 
retain two prosaving features of the tax system. First, when a saver does pay 
tax on interest earnings or dividends, they are taxed separately from his in- 
come and at a rate lower than the top marginal rate. Second, although the 
December 1988 tax reform, effective April 1989, instated the taxation of cap- 
ital gains on sales of securities (which were previously not taxed), the tax rate 
is still below that of the United States (especially since the  1986 U.S. tax 
reform) and other major countries. The saver gets his option of  1 percent of 
the value of the transaction or 20 percent of the capital gain (Ministry of Fi- 
nance 1988; Shoven 1989). 
Although one of  the reasons behind the Japanese tax reform was foreign 
pressure (gaiatsu) to make the Japanese system less prosaving and therefore 
more like the U.S. system, the effect of this decrease in the after-tax return on 
the supply of  saving and therefore on the real interest rate is  not clear. In 
theory, the substitution effect and income effect go in opposite directions. Sax- 
onhouse (1982) believes that the Japanese are, in fact, target savers: because 
their goal is to save enough to buy a home, a decrease in the after-tax rate of 
return means that they now need to save more, not less, to achieve the same 
goal. In empirical studies, a positive effect of the after-tax return on the saving 
rate has been difficult to find. (For Japan, see Makin 1985 and Hayashi 1986. 
Iwata, Suzuki, and Yoshida  1988, p.  129-31,  however, break down the tax 
saving rate of  institutional impediments that apply to future consumption as much as to current 
consumption. Wealth is only of use to the household to the extent that it is consumed sooner or 
later. 
55. Dekle (1989b) also focuses on the behavior of the Japanese elderly, finding that they are not 
dissaving as they should. Dekle (1989a) shows that the reason could be a combination of a strong 
bequest motive and a constraint against borrowing on home equity. 
56. Hale (1987, p.  27) believes that “any set of structural reforms which reduce the price of 
housing while increasing the tax incentive to own it could have a more dramatic effect on savings 
and consumption than many policies seemingly targeted on savings behavior itself.” 
57. The figure is from Shoven (1989). Furthermore, many households held more tax-free ac- 
counts than the number to which they were legally entitled; the total number of accounts in the 
Postal Savings System was said to be twice the population. 251  Japanese Finance 
rate and other variables by  income class and do find evidence of an effect in 
this way.) A simulation analysis in Hayashi et al. (1988) concluded that the 
Japanese saving rate would go down by a few percentage points if Japan were 
to abolish the maruyu, but this was not a statistical test.58 
8.4.2  International Capital Mobility 
Even if a tax reform or a land-use reform were to reduce the Japanese level 
of household saving toward that in Western countries, there is a serious further 
question as to whether such a change would lower the Japanese real interest 
rate or the cost of capital to firms. If capital is perfectly mobile internationally, 
it is argued, then a decline in national saving should not put any upward pres- 
sure on the rate of return within Japan but rather should be entirely offset by 
increased borrowing from abroad (and decreased lending abroad) at an un- 
changed rate of return.59 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) initiated what has proven to be a long-lasting 
debate by  observing that changes in countries’ rates of national saving in fact 
had  large effects on their rates of investment and interpreting the finding as 
evidence of low capital mobility. The paper was subjected to many economet- 
ric attacks, but the basic results seemed to hold up.6o 
It is possible to test the international equalization of  rates of return more 
directly. Many studies have documented the failure of real interest rates to be 
equalized across countries  ,61  seeming to confirm the Feldstein-Horioka re- 
sults. We  saw in section 8.1 that the Japanese real interest rate was below the 
U.S. rate throughout the 1980s. But the Japanese government announced the 
removal of controls on international capital movements in 1979-80,  and fur- 
ther liberalization measures in  1983-84,  partly in response to pressure from 
the U.S. Treasury.62  It is often argued that, if  capital markets are open, inter- 
national arbitrage should eliminate real interest differentials. Is it possible that 
the announced Japanese liberalization has failed to be genuine or complete? 
A number of  studies have shown, using data on covered interest differen- 
58. So far, there has apparently been no sign of a significant decrease in the household saving 
rate in Japan since the April  1988 abolishment of the maruyu. (It should be noted that the latest 
tax reform also instituted a sales tax-indeed  this was its politically most controversial feature- 
which could in theory have either a positive or negative effect on the savingkonsumption decision, 
depending particularly on whether households believe that the government will raise the sales tax 
rate in the future.) 
59. However it is fairly clear that such a decrease in saving would reduce the Japanese current 
account surplus-and  all the more so if capital is highly mobile-which  is what many Americans 
want. 
60. The “saving-retention” coefficient finally began to decline in the 1980s. however, according 
to the latest studies: Feldstein and Bacchetta (1989) and Frankel (1991). The latter paper contains 
65 references on the subject (many of them demonstrations that one can have a high correlation 
between saving and investment despite perfect capital mobility). 
61. See, e.g., Mishkin  (1984). Glick (1987) applies to Japan  and other Pacific countries in 
particular. 
62. The story of the U.S. Treasury campaign for the liberalization of  Japanese financial mar- 
kets. which began in October 1983, is told in Frankel (1984). 252  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
tials, that the 1979-80 and 1983-84 liberalizations  did indeed have the effects 
advertized (Otani and Tiwari 1981; Otani 1983; Frankel 1984, 1988b, 1991; 
Eken 1984; It0 1986). By now covered interest parity holds as well for Japan 
(vis-a-vis the Eurodollar market) as it does for such major countries as Can- 
ada, Germany, and the United Kingdom: the differential between the dollar 
interest rate and the interest rate on domestic currency is equal to the discount 
on the dollar in the forward exchange market. This finding suggests that Japan 
is highly integrated into world financial markets with respect to the movement 
of capital across national boundaries. 
The finding still leaves open the possibility of differences associated with 
the currency in  which an asset is denominated, as opposed to the political 
jurisdiction, in  which it is issued. For example, investors’ expectations that 
the dollar may in the future depreciate against the yen in nominal terms almost 
certainly explain why the yen interest rate was less than the dollar interest rate 
in the 1980~.~~  Similarly, expectations that the dollar may depreciate against 
the yen in real terms may explain why the yen real interest rate was less than 
the dollar real interest rate. In that case, the Feldstein-Horioka view is cor- 
rect-real  interest rates  are  not  necessarily  equalized internationally, and 
changes in saving (even if truly exogenous) need not be offset by borrowing 
from abroad and thus may be heavily reflected as changes in investment-and 
yet the explanation may be the imperfect international integration of  goods 
markets that allows failures of purchasing power parity, rather than imperfect 
international integration of financial markets. If there is no way of arbitraging 
directly among countries’ goods or among their plant and equipment, and if 
plant and equipment are imperfect substitutes for bonds within each country, 
then perfect international arbitrage among countries’ bonds is not sufficient to 
equalize real rates of return among countries’ plant and equipment. 
8.4.3 
It might be argued that real interest differentials and expectations of real 
depreciation exist only because of  short-run factors such as sticky goods 
prices, and that they must vanish in the long run.M  How then could the Japa- 
nese real interest rate have remained below the U.S. real interest rate for 30 
years? One possible answer is that capital controls prevented equalization in 
Long-Term Real Appreciation of the Yen 
63. The interest differential could in theory be explained by either of two terms (after the pos- 
sibility of a covered interest differential, or political premium, has been eliminated), both of them 
associated with the currency: expected depreciation or an exchange risk premium. The possible 
exchange risk premium  between the dollar and yen is examined by Fukao and Okuba (1984), 
Fukao (1987), Frankel and Froot (1987), Ito (1988). and Frankel (1988b). 
64. The real appreciation of  the dollar against the yen and European currencies beginning in 
1981 was widely considered an example of Dombusch “overshooting” caused by shifts in mone- 
tary or  fiscal policy: the real exchange rate change would disappear over time as U.S.  traded- 
goods prices adjusted downward in response to  excess supply and Japanese traded-goods prices 
adjusted upward in response to excess demand. 253  Japanese Finance 
the  1960s and  197Os,'j5 that the differential after liberalization in  the early 
1980s was a transitory phenomenon, and that henceforth the differential will 
be zero. 
But an alternative possibility is that investors have expected the yen to ap- 
preciate in real terms throughout the last 30 years. Let us decompose the real 
interest differential, r - r*, by  adding and subtracting the expected rate of 
appreciation of the yen, uppre: 
r - r*  = (i - infl) -  (i*  - infl*), 
= (i -  i*  -  uppr=) + (uppre - infl  + in$!*), 
where i and i*  are the Japanese and U.S. nominal interest rates, respectively, 
and inj  and inj* are the Japanese and U.S. expected inflation rates, respec- 
tively. We see that, even if the expected rate of returns on domestic and foreign 
bonds  are  equalized  when  expressed  in  a  common  currency,  that  is, 
i-i*-  uppr'  = 0, there will still be a nonzero real interest differential if 
there  is  a  nonzero  expected  future  real  appreciation  of  the  yen 
(uppr' -  inj + inj*). Expected real changes in the exchange rate would be 
ruled out if  purchasing power parity held, but it is well known by  now that 
purchasing power parity in fact fails to hold. 
One reason to believe that there has indeed been such an expectation is that 
survey data show that market participants in the 1980s indeed expected a rapid 
appreciation of the yen against the dollar (Frankel and Froot 1987; Ito 1990; 
Froot and Ito 1989). A second reason to believe this is that the yen in fact 
appreciated steadily against the dollar in real terms over the postwar period. 
During the fixed exchange rate era, 1950-73, the yen appreciated against the 
dollar at an average logarithmic rate of  3.66 percent per year in real terms 
(using the two countries consumer Price Indexes [CPIs] to deflate). During 
the floating rate era, 1973-89,  the real appreciation of the yen continued at an 
average rate of 3.46 percent per year. Even if  one believes that the yen over- 
shot its equilibrium somewhat as of 1989-and  many economists were saying 
that, to the contrary, the yen had not appreciated enough to be consistent with 
long-term fundamentals-the  basic point about the trend in the real exchange 
rate would be little affected. With such a strong trend in the real exchange rate 
over the preceding 40 years, it is easy to believe that investors have long since 
come to incorporate into their long-term expectations a real appreciation of 
the yen of  3 percent per year. Thus it is easy to believe that, even if  interna- 
tional  arbitrage  in  the  1980s drove  the  U.S.-Japan  interest  differential to 
65. One problem with identifying capital controls as the source of the U.S.-Japan  real interest 
differential throughout  the  1970s is that during the period  1976-78,  when the covered interest 
differential was the largest in absolute magnitude, the nominal interest in Tokyo was above the 
yen interest rate in the London Euromarket, demonstrating that controls were acting to discourage 
capital inflow, not outflow, at least at the short-term end of  the spectrum. 254  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
equality with expected appreciation of the yen, that this could have left a real 
interest differential as large as 3 percent. 
How could the yen appreciate steadily against the dollar in real terms over 
such a long period? Many consider the tendency for purchasing power parity 
to hold at least in the long run to be virtually the most fundamental and tradi- 
tional principle of international monetary economics. The observed trend also 
violates, to the extent that it is statistically significant, the currently popular 
hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random walk. 
A number of explanations have been attempted for the long-term trend in 
the real yen,  including a relatively low elasticity of imports with respect to 
income in Japan (Krugman 1989) and a relatively rapid rate of  productivity 
growth in Japanese manufacturing (Marston 1987). A natural explanation is 
the classical observed pattern, most often attributed to Balassa (1964), that a 
rapidly growing country tends (1) to experience an increase in the price of its 
nontraded goods relative to its internationally traded goods (because of higher 
productivity  growth  in  the  traded-goods  sector or else  because nontraded 
goods are superior goods in consumption),  and therefore (2) to exhibit an 
apparent real  appreciation of  its currency when the deflation is done using 
CPIs, which include a large share of nontradable goods within them. 
Let us look at the real exchange rate defined in terms of  consumer price 
indices: 
(3)  E,,,  = E [CPI* I CPI]. 
We  will represent the CPI in each country as a weighted average of nontraded 
goods and traded goods (in Cobb-Douglas form). We use a and a* to represent 
the weights of nontraded goods in the domestic and foreign country’s price 
indices, respectively: 
-  E[p,*o* p;Cl  -a*)/po  p(l  -a)]  (4)  Em1 -  n1 
= [(Pf/Pp)”*/(P,/P,)”][EP,*/P,]. 
If the “law of one price” does hold for traded goods, then P, = EPT, and the 
last bracketed term in (4) drops out: 
(5)  Em,, = [(P:/P,*).*/(P,/P,).]. 
Equation (5)  tells us that the real exchange rate will change if the relative price 
of  nontraded goods changes in  either the foreign country or the domestic 
country, even though purchasing power parity may hold perfectly well for the 
tradable share. 
This description sounds like it  was  specially designed for Japan,  where 
tradable goods consist primarily of  manufactured, agricultural, and mineral 
products,  and  nontradables  include  housing,  golf-club  memberships,  and 
other services. The model in Ito (1989) shows that if  the supply of  land is 
inelastic in Japan and elastic in the United States, the yen will appear to appre- 255  Japanese Finance 
ciate in real terms as the economies grow (where the price of housing services 
is included in the relevant CPI). 
Testing the hypothesis of a change in the relative price of nontraded goods, 
however, is more difficult than it might seem. Most sectors are at least partly 
traded in character. Table 8.3 singles out  17 specific services that are fairly 
clearly nor traded and shows the relative change in their prices in Tokyo over 
the period  1972-87.  Ten of the services, including particularly the forms of 
urban transportation,  went up in price more than the general CPI, and seven 
less.66  This provides some support for the hypothesis, though less than one 
might have expected. 
There is an alternative way to view the decomposition of the economy into 
traded and nontraded. Virtually all sectors use at least some amount of inter- 
nationally traded goods as intermediate inputs in production  (e.g., energy). 
At  the same time, virtually all sectors involve at least some domestic value 
added before the product in question is sold to the consumer, even if it is only 
shipping, marketing, and retailing. Indeed, the amount of resources devoted 
to the distribution system is notoriously high in Japan. It is possible that each 
sector has experienced an increase in the price of nontraded value added and 
inputs relative to its traded value added and inputs. Such a trend would explain 
a real appreciation of the yen calculated with CPls, or even more disaggre- 
gated industry prices, even if the law of one price held perfectly for the traded 
component. This hypothesis may show up in the increasing ratio of the CPI to 
producer price indices or unit labor costs in Japan. It is also relevant to the 
recent literature on pricing markups for Japanese imports and export~.~’  In any 
case, the hypothesis bears further investigation. 
Regardless of whether the relative price of nontraded goods does in fact 
prove to be the correct explanation of the real appreciation of the yen, it is 
undeniable that a strong sustained trend of real appreciation has taken place, 
with the implication that a real interest differential of 2 or even 3 percent is 
perfectly consistent with highly integrated financial markets. 
I  have argued that, even if Japanese corporations are now no more highly 
levered than American corporations, and even if  international arbitrage now 
equates the Japanese and foreign nominal interest rates (when expressed in a 
common currency), that the Japanese real interest rate could still lie below the 
foreign rate. A real interest differential in the 1980s-whatever  its source- 
could in turn help explain high average price/earnings ratios in the Japanese 
stock market, high pricekental ratios in the Japanese land market, and a lower 
66. The source is the Bank of  Japan. If  the price of housing and the rental rate are added to the 
list,  then the number increasing faster than the CPI is  11 out of  19. The answers are the same 
regardless whether the Tokyo ZPI is used (Management and Coordination Agency, a prewar base) 
or a national CPI (IFS). 
67. On pricing-to-market by Japanese firms, see Branson and Marston (1989). Froot (1988), 
Marston (1990), and Ohno (1989). 256  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
cost of capital to some Japanese firms.68  But the argument about the low real 
interest rate might seem to apply to the past in Japan as much as, or more 
than, to the 1980s. Similarly, the argument that the expected rate of real eco- 
nomic growth in Japan is high applies to the past as much as, or more than, it 
does to the present. How can one explain that price/eamings ratios and price/ 
rental ratios were not also high in the past, that is, that they rose sharply in the 
1980s? 
8.5  Internal Corporate Financing and Relationship Banking, 
Versus the Market System 
The standard formula for the price/eamings ratio and the pricehental ratio, 
l/(r - g), assumes r, the real interest rate (or a required rate of return equal 
to the real interest rate marked up by a risk premium), is relevant for discount- 
ing expected future returns. This assumption is  appropriate for economies 
where corporate finance is oriented around a unified central market, that is, a 
common pool of  funds into which most savers deposit and from which most 
investors draw off.69  This description applies to the United States, and it ap- 
plies increasingly to Japan today. But it did not apply very well to Japan in the 
1970s, and still less so in the 1960s, as Meerschwam (in this volume) explains 
at greater length. 
The existence of lending by  government agencies to favored firms in  fa- 
vored industries at subsidized rates, and the artificial “repression” of  other 
interest rates through regulation and  administrative guidance, have  always 
been  major ways that Japanese corporations have  been thought to have an 
“unfair” cost-of-capital advantage in  the past.70  Equally familiar is the claim 
that large corporations or keiretsu take profits from one activity and  cross- 
subsidize investment in another. But it has seldom been clear why Japanese 
industry should want to do this.71 
68. One must note, however, that if “the” real interest rate was lower in Japan than the United 
States only because of an expected rate of real appreciation of the yen in terms of a basket of 
goods that includes nontraded goods, it can only explain high equity prices or a low cost of capital 
wirhin the nontraded goods sector or for the average across the entire economy. It cannot explain 
a low cost of capital for Japanese firms producing rruded goods, which are the ones from whom 
American businessmen fear competition. 
69. Note that this does not preclude some firms having projects with rates of return greater than 
the market rate or internal funding sources at costs less than the market rate; it requires only that 
the market rate be the marginal cost of funds for most firms. 
70. Of  12 government financial institutions-which  as recently as 1980 supplied 17 percent of 
funds for investment in plant and equipment-the  Japan Development Bank and the Small Busi- 
ness Finance Corporation were particularly notable in channeling subsidized investment funds to 
selected industries (Lee 1988, pp. 25-36).  The more general low-interest rate policy of the gov- 
ernment before 1973 was explicit (e.g., Tamura 1987). 
71. See Abegglen and Stalk (1985). Gerlach (1987) and Hodder and Tschoegl (1985). If the 
investment is expected to be profitable in the long run, then it should take place in a market- 
oriented financial system such as the United States, with the investment funded by borrowing in 
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Recent theoretical developments have helped us understand better how the 
cost of internal finance can be less than the cost of external finance.72  One 
route is asymmetric information, between the firm’s managers and the typical 
stockholder or bond holder in the market, regarding the rate of return on an 
investment; another  route  is  incentive  or “agency” problems.  “Internal  fi- 
nance” in the United States would be the corporation’s financing of an invest- 
ment out of retained earnings (or out of depreciation charges), as opposed to 
financing at market rates by borrowing from a bank or issuing securities. 
Retained earnings are also important in Japan, important in particular  to 
understanding why the cost of capital remained low in the 1970s. Ever since 
the Japanese economic growth rate fell off  with the oil shock of  1973, the 
number of  profitable  investment  projects has  fallen short of  the  supply of 
funds available. (In the national savings identity, the offset to the increase in 
the saving-investment  balance of the corporate sector was primarily a large 
increase in the government budget deficit in the  1970s, followed by  a large 
increase in the current account surplus in the  1980s.) In other words, since 
1973, firms have been able to finance investments out of retained earnings to 
a  much  greater  extent  than  previously.  Retained  earnings  appear  to  be  a 
cheaper source of financing than issuing corporate debt or equity, because they 
get around problems of  incomplete information or incentive incompatibility. 
It can be argued that in Japan “internal finance” de fact0 includes as well 
borrowing by a firm from its main bank under a long-term relationship. The 
reasoning is that the main bank, like a large shareholder (which, in fact, it 
often is) can keep close tabs on what goes on inside the firm, thus largely 
obviating information and incentive  Hodder (1988b) concludes 
that the advantages of “lender monitoring” are key, and that they may explain 
why  studies like Ando and Auerbach (1988) find that the cost of  capital is 
lower in Japan than in the United States.74 
Empirical evidence in  support of the proposition  that internal and main- 
bank finance are cheaper than external or market finance is offered by some 
recent microeconomic studies of the determinants of firm investment. It has 
72. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) in the macroeconomic literature, and Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) in the finance literature. The first two focus on 
information costs, the last on incentive problems. 
73.  For  example,  Crum and Meerschwam  (1986). Hamada  and  Horiuchi  (1987), Hodder 
(1988a. 1988b). and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a.  1990b). Japanese financial institu- 
tions (including not just banks, but also life insurance companies and other institutional investors), 
unlike their US.  counterparts, are allowed to take large debt and equity positions in the same 
firm; Prowse (1989) argues that this difference constitutes in itself a way that the Japanese system 
is better able to circumvent agency problems. 
74. His argument  is that the advantages of  lender monitoring  may  show up in  part as low 
reported earningsiprice  ratios because banks receive payments for their services in the form of 
“compensating balances” and transactions fees, which come out of reported corporate earnings, 
rather than in the form of  interest payments. On the general point that the apparent cost of borrow- 
ing is understated in Japan by the requirement of compensating balances, see, e.g., Bronte (1982, 
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long been true that variables such as cash flow did a better job econometrically 
of explaining business fixed investment than theoretically preferable variables 
such as the real  interest rate  and Tobin’s Q (at least when each factor was 
considered on its own; e.g., Jorgenson 1971; Meyer and Kuh 1957). The new 
theories  of  information  and incentive  problems,  however,  now  provide the 
desired rigorous  theoretical basis for including cash flow.  Fazzari, Hubbard, 
and Petersen (1988) have estimated regression equations for investment on a 
cross-section of  U.S. firms.  They distinguish  firms that pay low dividends, 
which  they  assume are liquidity  constrained, from others.  They show that 
cash flow is a more important determinant of investment in the former group, 
which they interpret as evidence in favor of the internal-finance hypothesis. 
(Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market price of equity to replacement cost, is also 
included as an explanatory variable, to capture expectations of the return on 
investment.)  One can interpret  such findings as analogous to the Feldstein- 
Horioka result: just as a high correlation of national saving and investment 
across countries suggests that there may exist some barriers that separate in- 
dividual countries from the worldwide capital market,  so does high correla- 
tion of corporate saving and investment across firms suggest that there may 
exist  barriers  that  separate  individual  firms  from  the  nationwide  capital 
market. 
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a) apply a similar methodology to 
Japan, where the segregation of firms can be more persuasively accomplished. 
They break down a sample into two groups. One consists of  121 “affiliated’ 
firms, those with ties to large banks (typically a main bank) that are part of  its 
keiretsu. The other consists of 25 “independent” firms, without close links to 
any particular  bank. They find that among the independent firms, cash flow 
positively  affects investment (and Tobin’s Q does not), while among the affil- 
iated firms cash flow has no significant effect.75  The conclusion is that the first 
group faces a barrier between the cost of financing investment out of retained 
earnings and the cost of borrowing,  like American firms do, while the latter 
can borrow from their affiliated banks as easily as financing out of retained 
earnings. The authors conclude that one possible implication is that “the insti- 
tutional arrangements in Japan may offer Japanese firms an important compet- 
itive advantage” (p. 24). 
The hypothesis that internal and indirect finance (especially from the main 
bank) is cheaper than direct or market finance can thus support the claim that 
the true cost of capital to Japanese corporations (at least those that are mem- 
bers of  keiretsu) has been low in the past.  But established banking relation- 
ships have begun to break down in Japan and the market has begun  to take 
their place, as corporations begin to use banks less and bond markets more, a 
75. Hayashi and Inoue (1989) find that Q is significantly related to firm growth, and that much, 
though not all, of  the power of cash flow to explain investment in a cross-section of Japanese firms 
disappears when correcting for the endogeneity of cash flow. They do not segregate affiliated and 
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process that accelerated  in the  1980s as the result of international liberaliza- 
tion as well  as domestic dereg~lation.~~  The share of  bank  lending in total 
external financing fell from 84 percent in 1971-75,  to 57 percent in 1981-85, 
as many firms found they could borrow more easily or more cheaply on the 
open market.  But if the relevant  interest rate was higher in the 1980s than it 
was in the past, this raises some difficult questions.77  The first question, which 
we now consider,  is how one explains the fact that pricelearnings and price/ 
rental ratios were  lower in previous  decades than today.  (The second, why 
firms would voluntarily abandon advantageous banking arrangements,  is ad- 
dressed subsequently.) 
We must ask who would have had the opportunity to arbitrage between the 
low “cost of capital” and the high expected future return  to holding land or 
equities. For those who had the opportunity to buy land, plant and equipment, 
or equity,  the opportunity  cost of  funds was high, a number more like the 
observed rate of return on equity or the growth rate of the economy than like 
the observed interest rate or the still lower cost of internal finan~e.’~  The indi- 
vidual small investor did not have such opportunities; he was given little alter- 
native to depositing his savings  in  a low-interest-rate  The same 
was, to a certain extent, true of institutional investors such as pension funds 
and insurance companies, and in any case the pool of available savings in such 
institutions was far smaller than in the 1980s. A corporation that was favored 
with access to cheap loans from the government or from its main bank was not 
generally free to use those funds to “speculate” in land or in the shares of other 
corporations. Nor was it allowed for the firm to buy back its own shares, when 
it should have had plenty of profitable new projects to invest in (Hatsopoulos 
and Brooks 1989, p. 12). Thus the arbitrage between the interest rate and real 
assets that we take for granted in a market-oriented  system was not entirely 
relevant in the earlier period. 
As noted, firms have begun  to rely less on banks for their financing  and 
more on marketplace  borrowing, due in large part to deregulation and inter- 
nationalization.  The most  important liberalizations  include:  the  removal  of 
76. Crum and Meerschwam (1986) and Meerschwam (in this volume), e.g.,  discuss the decline 
of “relationship banking” and its replacement by the market. 
77. Despite the diminished importance of  subsidized government lending and the main-bank 
system, the era of  cheaper capital through internal finance was prolonged past 1973 in Japan by 
the greater availability of  retained earnings when the number of profitable investment projects that 
needed to be financed diminished. The share of  funds coming from internal finance narrowly 
defined (retained earnings and depreciation charges), as opposed to external finance (securities- 
issues and borrowings), rose from 32.9 percent in the period 1970-74  to 46.3  percent in the period 
1975-78,  and stayed in that neighborhood subsequently (1979-85;  the source is Tamura 1987, p. 
3). It is the changes of  the 1980s that need explaining. 
78. When markets in government bonds and other instruments did begin to develop, especially 
in the 1970s. the observed interest rate was presumably somewhere between the low cost of  inter- 
nal and subsidized finance and the high rate of return to physical investment. 
79. As noted in Meerschwam (in this volume), only preexisting shareholders received advanta- 
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ceilings on interest rates after 1978 (in response to growing reluctance on the 
part of banks to absorb growing quantities of government debt at artificially 
low interest rates), the switch to a presumption that firms were allowed to sell 
bonds to foreign residents (as part of the Foreign Exchange Law reform) in 
1980, the legalization of warrant bonds in 1981, the legalization of noncolla- 
teralized bonds for sufficiently safe corporations beginning in  1983, and the 
liberalization of issues of  Euroyen bonds as part of the yerddollar negotiations 
between the Ministry of Finance and the U.S. Treasury in 1984. More recent 
measures taken pursuant to the YedDollar Agreement include: establishment 
of  new  short-term  financial  markets (in yen-denominated banker’s accept- 
ances, June  1985,80  short-term bonds, November 1986, and commercial pa- 
per, November  1987), further liberalization regarding the Euromarket (such 
as allowing foreign companies to lead-manage Eurobond issues in December 
1986, and introducing rating systems for Eurobonds in  1987), establishment 
of  an  offshore market  in Japan (December  1986), the admission of  major 
American securities companies to the Tokyo Stock Exchange (approximately 
22 by the end of 1987), and inclusion of foreign firms in the syndicate through 
which the Japanese government sells its bonds and in the trust business (nine 
banks authorized after October  1985). In addition, the Ministry of  Finance 
liberalized restrictions on what share of  their portfolios Japanese insurance 
companies and trust banks could hold in the form of  foreign securities (in 
1986 and 1987).*l 
Note that even for those steps that represent domestic innovation or dereg- 
ulation as opposed to international liberalization, foreigners have been an im- 
portant driving force. There has been  both  direct political pressure on  the 
Japanese government from foreign governments and competitive pressures on 
Japanese financial institutions from the activities of foreign rivals. 
In a follow-up paper, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990b) address the 
gradual weakening of  the links between banks and affiliated firms that has 
been taking place in Japan. Choosing 1983 as the first year in which the effects 
of deregulation were fully felt, they begin with their sample of firms that had 
close banking ties during the period 1977-82,  and divide it into a subsample 
that shifted emphasis thereafter from bank borrowing to direct market finance 
and a subsample who continued to rely primarily on their banks; they find that 
the former group developed a strong sensitivity of  investment to cash flow 
after 1983, while the latter group did not. This constitutes further evidence 
that  bank borrowing in Japan obviates some of  the usual costs of external 
financing. 
80. Volume in the yen-denominated Bankers’ Acceptances market soon began to decline, how- 
ever, in favor of other instruments, and it died out completely in November 1989 (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, 14 December 1989). 
81. Shinkai (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990b), Crumand Meerschwam (1986), 
Feldman (1986). Frankel (1984), Sakakibara and Kondoh (1984), Suzuki (1987). and Ido (1989), 
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Some have surmised that, if  public policy and the main-bank system have 
kept the cost of capital artificially low in Japan in the past, the deregulation 
and internationalization  of Japanese financial markets must now have elimi- 
nated that advantage. Even if we could be confident that the Japanese cost of 
capital has been raised in this manner, that would still leave open the question 
of whether or not the traditional system produced a greater level of economic 
efficiency for the economy overall.  On the one hand, any way of  obviating 
information or incentive problems must represent a gain. On the other hand, 
the  exclusion of  certain firms  and  certain  industries from the  privileges of 
cheaper financing  is  only  beneficial  if  there  exists  some decision-making 
mechanism superior to the market to decide who is worthy of  inclusion and 
who is not-a  questionable proposition. 
It  is  also possible  that  the  previous  system  of  denying  Japanese  savers, 
banks, and taxpayers an opportunity to earn an equilibrium rate of  return on 
their savings, even if inefficient in the economists’ sense that it failed to max- 
imize intertemporal welfare, nevertheless produced an (artificially) high level 
of investment. Such a proposition would be consistent with the legendary Jap- 
anese corporate emphasis on maximizing  market  share at the  short-run  ex- 
pense of current profits (e.g., Abegglen and Stalk 1985; Crum and Meersch- 
wam  1986; Meerschwam, in this volume).  An alternative line of  argument, 
adopted  by  Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Summers (1988), is that the  U.S. 
market system gives rise to an inefficiently low level of investment because of 
excessive concern with short-term profits and capital gains, at the expense of 
longer-term investment opportunities.82  Perhaps the United States has recently 
been working to “drag the Japanese down to its level.” 
In any case, a puzzle remains. If the effective cost of capital under the tra- 
ditional system is less than the market interest rate under the new system, why 
are Japanese firms voluntarily giving up their advantageous main-banking re- 
lationships for the difficulties of the marketplace? Hodder (1988b) concludes 
that, if firms are leaving their main-bank relationships, it must be because it is 
advantageous  to do so, although  he also concludes  that it must  have been 
advantageous for them to enter into these relationships in the first place. 
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990b) suggest a possible explanation to 
the paradox: there are hidden costs to the system of bank monitoring,  and a 
cheaper way of overcoming  the information  and incentive obstacles to bor- 
rowing-which  is  available  only  to  older,  well-established,  successful 
firms-is  to take advantage of the firm’s reputation by  issuing highly  rated 
The alternative possibility is that the change is not desirable from the 
82. McKinnon (1989) argues that excessively short investment horizons in the United States (in 
contrast to Japan) are attributable to high interest rates, which are in turn attributable to the risk of 
dollar depreciation against the yen under the floating exchange rate system. Stein (1989) offers a 
theory with more rigorous foundations. 
83. It is noteworthy that agencies to rate the creditworthiness of corporations (the analogues of 
Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s) did not develop in Japan until recently. 262  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
viewpoint of  the well-established firms. Unfortunately for this hypothesis, 
there is little evidence that banks and other financial institutions are supplying 
less credit to their domestic clients (or offering less-favorable terms) and in- 
stead taking advantage of the higher interest rates in the United States by lend- 
ing abroad. Still, it may not be possible for trust and long-term relationships 
to survive in an environment where newcomers deal only in explicit contracts. 
Even under this theory, which agrees that the typical keiretsu firm may face 
a higher cost of capital now than in the past, the deregulation and internation- 
alization of Japanese financial markets over the last 10 years is advantageous 
to one group of  firms: those that never had  access to preferential financing 
from main banks or government agencies in the past. While small firms lack 
the reputation necessary to borrow abroad even today, there are many  large 
and medium-sized firms that were never members of  keiretsu or favored by 
the government and had little means of financing expansion before the advent 
of  free financial markets. For this group, internationalization has probably 
lowered the cost of capital, whether they now finance themselves by  issuing 
bonds in the Euromarket or in newly liberalized domestic 
8.6  Conclusions 
The overall conclusions that emerge from the literature may be summarized 
as follows. (1) The cost of capital was lower in Japan than in the United States 
in the 1970s and 1980s. (2) One aspect of this difference was lower real inter- 
est rates. (3) Low real interest rates and high expected growth rates can go far 
toward explaining the high levels of equity and land prices (relative to earn- 
ings and rents, respectively) but not the great increases of the 1980s. (4) The 
high Japanese saving rate was responsible for the low real interest rates; Japa- 
nese tax policy plays no clear role. (5)  Financial liberalization narrowed cost- 
of-capital differences in the  1980s; now  Japanese saving goes to finance in- 
vestment abroad almost as easily as at home. 
Further conclusions of this paper that are perhaps novel are as follows. (6) 
It is possible for the real interest rate in Japan to be below that in the United 
States, despite international arbitrage. (7) The main relevant effect of the in- 
ternationalization in Japan may have been to accelerate the process whereby 
corporate finance becomes market oriented, so that (8) affiliated firms are los- 
ing the special privilege of borrowing at a cheaper rate, while (9) unaffiliated 
firms are now able to borrow more cheaply than before, at the going interest 
rate. Finally, (10) the increased availability of funds that can be used for asset- 
market arbitrage allowed the great run-up in equity prices and land prices in 
the 1980s. 
84. Many Japanese corporations now borrow in the Euromarkets in, e.g.,  Luxembourg. Often 
convertible and warrant issues are ultimately acquired by Japanese residents. In this way interna- 
tionalization facilitates an end run around domestic Japanese rigidities, and makes Japanese fi- 
nance more market oriented, even when neither the borrower nor the lender is foreign. 263  Japanese Finance 
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Comment  Robert Dekle 
Jeffrey Frankel’s main aim in the paper is to try to explain the high Japanese 
stock and  land prices by  the fundamentals valuation equation. Ruling out 
speculative bubbles,  the  price-rental or price-earnings ratios  will  be  high 
when the expected rate of economic growth is high or the real interest rate is 
low.  The puzzle, as stated by  the author, is this: Why have the price-rental 
ratios risen so rapidly in the  1980s compared to the  1960s when today the 
expectations of future economic growth are so much lower and the observed 
real interest rate is probably higher? The paper proposes an innovative answer. 
In the past, capital in Japan was rationed by the banking system, and only the 
large blue chip firms could raise funds at the low real interest rate. The use of 
these funds, however, was strictly monitored by the banks, and the firms could 
not use these funds to freely engage in large-scale purchases of land and equi- 
ties. Hence, in the 1960s and early 1970s, there was imperfect arbitrage be- 
tween the low cost of capital and the high expected future returns to holding 
land or equities. The deregulation of  Japanese financial markets in the late 
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1970s and  1980s enabled smaller firms and individuals to take advantage of 
this arbitrage opportunity, and the result was the bidding up of asset prices. 
The argument, unfortunately, is not entirely convincing. First, the effective 
cost of capital for the highly leveraged large companies in the 1960s was not 
as low as the author alleges. It is well known that many Japanese banks during 
this  period  demanded “compensating balances” from the consumer firms, 
adding to the firms’ cost of borrowing, the spread between the deposit rate, 
and the return from productive investment. Yoshio Suzuki estimates that the 
effective loan rates to large firms in the 1964-73  period were between 8 and 
12 percent, which were well above the regulated interest rates of 3-4  percent. 
Second, it is unclear whether the demand for funds by  small and medium- 
sized enterprises  actually  exceeded  the  supply of  funds.  During  the  late 
1960s, the local banks, which primarily lend to small and medium-sized en- 
terprises, had more deposits than the demand for loans. The surplus was chan- 
neled through the Japanese “call money” market to the large city banks, which 
lend mostly to the large firms.’ If they so desired, the small and medium-sized 
sector should have been able to borrow and purchase land and equities. 
Third, it  is somewhat misleading to argue that the Japanese government 
until recently regulated speculation in the asset markets. The stock market 
crash in 1964-65  was exacerbated by securities companies using their market 
power to  prop up prices.2 The surge in  land prices between  1972-73  was 
largely caused by  companies purchasing land nationwide in anticipation of 
Premier Tanaka’s massive regional public works projects. 
Consequently, it appears that even before the recent financial deregulation, 
investors were able to and did take full advantage of arbitrage opportunities 
between the real rate of interest and the expected return on land and stocks. 
What then are the causes for the recent rise in  the land price-rental and 
equity-price earnings ratios? The paper reads as if company earnings and land 
rents are driven by the same mechanism. For an office-space leasing company, 
rents and earnings may move identically, but for firms producing goods that 
are intensive in physical capital, land rents and earnings are likely to diverge. 
Corporate profits  in Japan have drastically fallen as a share of  GNP in the 
period between 1970 and 1985, and one reason for the fall is the decline in the 
marginal product of physical capital. As an economy grows and accumulates 
capital, it may be possible to observe corporate profits falling, and the returns 
to the fixed factor, land, rising. For example, falling returns to physical capital 
and rising returns to land may be observed in a three-factor (land, labor, capi- 
tal) Cobb-Douglas production function. 
If corporate profits have fallen, why have Japanese stock prices risen? There 
I.  The call market essentially corresponds in function to the federal funds market in the United 
2. As a consequence of the crash, Yamaichi Securities was almost driven to bankruptcy. 
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are two popular hypotheses. The first is called the “restructuring hypothesis” 
and explains the high cross-section correlation between stock and land prices. 
Take  the example of  Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries, a shipbuilder 
with high stock prices but with depressed corporate profits. Ishikawajima Har- 
ima owns much land in Tokyo Bay, an area expected to receive large govern- 
ment public works funding over the next decade. There is to be a landfill and 
major office buildings and retail complexes, and  apartments are to be con- 
structed. In the future, if  Ishikawajima is able to use its land efficiently, say, 
by converting its shipbuilding factories to retail outlets, then the firm’s profits 
should soar. The present high price for Ishikawajima’s stock partly reflects the 
expectation that the firm, by restructuring, will be able to use its assets effi- 
ciently and raise its future profits. 
Cross-section econometric studies have shown that firms with high price- 
earnings ratios generally own expensive land. The “restructuring” hypothesis 
does not, however, explain why land prices have doubled over the last three 
years. The second hypothesis relies on imperfect international  capital mobility 
and excess Japanese liquidity to explain both high land and equity prices. 
From the fall of  1986 until now, the growth in the Japanese money supply has 
been much higher than in the previous half-decade. It has been said that the 
Bank of Japan had embarked on a loose monetary policy to prop up the dollar. 
Exchange rate risk has limited the flow of Japanese funds abroad and, given 
the artificially low rate of return on Japanese bank deposits, funds have flowed 
into real estate and stocks, bidding up the price of these assets. 